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Petroplus: Easement of Necessity--Increasing the Servitude

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
The injustice of the rule in Cariens v. (ariens, supra, will terminate in West Virginia probably without the necessity of the court
reversing itself. Under the code of West Virginia", which takes
effect January 1, 1931, the state has fallen in line with a great
number of the states, and has by statute given the court power to
revise the decree for alimony, whether for divorce from bed and
board or absolute divorce, "as the altered circumstances or needs
of the parties may render necessary to meet the ends of justice".
-JOHN HAmPTON HoGm

EASEMENTS OF NECESSrY-INCREASING THE SERWTuE.-It appeared in a recent decision that one of the defendants had an
easement of necessity from his 95-acre tract across the plaintiff's
land to a nearby road and became owner of an adjoining tract
of 31 acres. He sold the timber on the 31-acre tract to the other
defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiff an injunction to
On
restrain the transportation of this timber across his land.
appeal, reversed. Held, that an owner having an easement of
necessity as to one tract of land, cannot as a matter of right ex.
tend such easement to other lands he may subsequently acquire.
Dorsey v. Dorsey.'
The Court followed the old English case, Howell v. King,* holding that one having a right of way to Blackacre over the land of
another has no right to drive his cattle to land beyond Blackaere.
The doctrine that a way to a tract of land cannot be used as a
way to additional land adjoining is settled in West Virginia.'
The Ohio case of Remington v. Fireproof Warelwuse: Company,"
suggests a variation. The right of way was extended to the use of a
subsequently-purchased 10-foot strip of ground and the court
held that a driveway could be used to the benefit of newly ac-

"Ch. 48, art. 2, § 15.
1153 S. E. 146 (W. Va. 1930). See generally JONES ON EASEMENTS (1898)

§ 360.

21 Mod. 190 (1674).

3 Shaver v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 502, 37 S. E. 664 (1900) ; McNeil v. Kennedy,
88 W. Va. 524, 107 S. E. 203 (1920); Bennett v. Booth, 70 W. Va. 264, 73
S. E. 909, (1912); see Springer v. McIntyre, 9 W. Va. 196 (1876); Powell
v. Simms, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871); Standiford v. Goudy, 6 W. Va. 364 (1873).
' 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 301, 87 Ohio St. 523 (aff'd).
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quired land if the additional burden on the servient tenement was

slight.
Suppose the timber on the above-mentioned 31-acre tract ,had
first been piled on the 95-acre tract for the purpose of drying.
In the case of
Could it then be hauled over the right of way?
Williams v. James," hay from land adjoining was stacked on the
dominant land, and later was carted across the servient tenement.
The English court said that the defendant could make an ordinary
and reasonable use of the dominant field, but could not use it as
a pretext to increase the scope of the easement. The jury found that
the defendant was making a bona fide use of his land in stacking
A
hay on it. It followed that his use of the way was proper.
similar situation would arise here if the timber was piled on the
If this
dominant land to dry and then hauled across the way.
were done bona fide, and not as a pretext to secure the use of the
way, it would seem to be a reasonable use of the dominant land.
If so, the defendant could then transport the timber over the way,
although it would indirectly benefit land adjoining the dominant
tenement. The West Virginia Court has held that a way of necessity is granted for any and all purposes for which land is reasonably adapted
It would seem to follow that timber or other
products from. adjoining land might be brought on the dominant
tenement for any reasonable purpose and later hauled therefrom
across the way.
-A.
VILLIAM PETROPLUS.

EQUITY-SHOWING

A

DEED

ABSOLUTE ON

ITS FACE TO BE A

MORTGAGE-EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY IN TRANSATIN.-Miller

ap-

plied to McNabb for a loan of $100,000, who instead of taking
a lien on his property as security had him to convey
the same to 'him in fee, giving Miller a lease on same for five
years with the option to repurchase for the amount of the loan.
After MeNabb died,
This was done to avoid usury and taxation.
Ben Lomond Company, assignee of Miller, sought to repurchase the
property. Trial court decreed that the $100,000 be paid to
Florence McNabb, the widow. The heirs appealed and the Supreme
Court reversed the decree and refused to give effect to the parol
£2 C. P. 577 (1867).
8
Crotty v. New River Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233 (1913); Ulil v.
Railroad Co., 47 W. Va. 59, 34 S. E. 934 (1899).
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